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EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE MINNESOTA
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT:
A SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF POWER?
Tell an engineer that his dam will destroy a salmon run and he
will meet that problem with a fish ladder. Tell him that his fish
ladder will create another problem, and he will deal with that-
but never by abandoning the fish ladder and certainly never by
questioning the existence of the dam. What he will not do is look
at the totality of what he is doing.1
Public concern with the destruction of the natural environment has
resulted in state legislation granting citizens the right to sue to enjoin
environmentally harmful conduct.2 Because such legislation is recent
and varies in scope from state to state, 3 a complete assessment of its
impact is not yet available.4 The decision of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in County of Freeborn v. Bryson5 is the first to affirm that
such citizen-suit statutes confer standing to oppose an exercise of the
eminent domain power.6 Should Bryson prove a benchmark in the
1. G. MARINE, AmERICA THE RAPED: THE ENGINEERING MENTALITY AND THE
DEVASTATION OF A CONTINENT 201 (1969).
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412
(1973); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 13-6-1-1 (Bums 1973); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
214, § 10A (Supp. 1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Supp. 1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (Supp. 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §
21-IOA-1 (Supp. 1974).
3. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (1973) with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B
(Supp. 1974).
4. Professor J. L. Sax of the University of Michigan has published two progress
reports detailing developments under the Michigan legislation, which was the first
of the citizen-suit statutes to be enacted. See Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICN. L. REv. 1003 (1972) ;
Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1974).
5 ................. Minn ................. , 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973). Bryson is the first case
to be decided under the Minnesota legislation.
6. "Any person residing within the state . . . may maintain a civil action ...
for declaratory or equitable relief ... against any person, for the protection of...
natural resources located within the state .... " MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03(1)
(Supp. 1974).
"Person" means any natural person, any state, municipality or other govern-
mental or political subdivision or other public agency or instrumentality, any
public or private corporation, any partnership, firm, association, or other or-
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environmental citizen-suit field, the possibility of such suits clearly
will be a factor for public and private planners to consider in the
future.
The Bryson case was instituted in response to highway condemna-
tion proceedings initiated by the County.7 Plaintiffs opposed the tak-
ing of marsh land on their farm, which had been privately dedicated
for use as a wildlife refuge.8 Pursuant to the Minnesota Environ-
mental Rights Act (MERA),9 they sued to enjoin the condemnation
on the ground that highway construction across their land would
"materially adversely affect" portions of the habitat. Plaintiffs ap-
pealed from a dismissal for failure to establish a prima facie case
under MERA.10 The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed and re-
manded, holding that MERA "limit[s] the power of governmental
subdivisions in eminent domain proceedings."1 Thus Bryson deals
with an important question regarding the intended operation of
MERA, the answer to which may have far-reaching consequences for
the exercise of the eminent domain power in Minnesota and in other
jurisdictions having similar legislation.12
ganization, any receiver, trustee, assignee, agent, or other legal representa-
tive of any of the foregoing, and any other entity, except a family farm ....
Id. § 116B.02(2).
"'Pollution, impairment or destruction' is any conduct by any person ... which
materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the environ-
ment.... ." Id. § 116B.02(5).
7 ............. Minn. at ......., 210 N.W.2d at 292.
8. Id. at ................ ,210 N W.2d at 293.
9. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02(5) (Supp. 1974). The taking involved a
seven-tenths acre portion of the 19 acres designated by the owner as a wildlife
area. The area had been developed as a wildlife habitat through excavation of
ponds, maintenance of a one-acre unharvested food plot, and fir tree plantings.
The proposed highway would divide the marsh area, which contained varied plant
and animal life and was part of a larger slough complex. Expert witnesses
for the owner testified that the proposed construction would have a detrimental
effect upon the marsh area's value as a wildlife habitat because it would eliminate
natural assets, destroy the quiet and solitude of the area, increase animal and bird
fatalities, and have other adverse effects. ................ Minn. at ........, 210
N.W.2d at 292-93.
10 ................. Minn. at ................, 210 N.W.2d at 292.
11. Id. at ................, 210 N.W.2d at 295.
12 In three Michigan cases landowners have challenged the condemnation of
transmission line rights-of-way by privately owned utilities. Two are still pending
in court; plaintiff accepted a handsome money settlement in the other. In the
most interesting of these, the probate court ruled that in condemnation proceed-
ings property owners are precluded from offering any proofs relating to the neces-
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Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property for
public use without the owner's consent.'13 It is an "attribute of sover-
eignty"' 4 and thus is a power inherent in both the federal-s and state
governments. 16 The exercise of the power of eminent domain is lim-
ited by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which forbid the taking
of private property without due process of law.17 To defeat condem-
nation in an eminent domain proceeding, an owner must prove that
the taking of his property is "arbitrary or unreasonable."' 8 In Min-
nesota an owner could not challenge a taking on the ground that it was
unnecessary for a public purpose because the question of necessity,
being legislative, was not subject to judicial review.' 9 Thus absent
fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion by the condemnor, the barest
showing of necessity would ordinarily sustain a condemnation.20 Tra-
sity of placing the power lines overhead as opposed to underground. The circuit
court overruled this interpretation of the Michigan law and, by an order of super-
intending control, expanded the proofs in the condemnation proceedings to in-
clude questions of the protection of air, water and other natural resources from
destruction. Sax & DiMento, supra note 4, at 15-21. Although the Michigan
eminent domain cases to date are factually distinguishable, Bryson may prove to
be valuable precedent since the Minnesota law was styled after Michigan's. Note,
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. Rav. 575, 577 (1972);
see note 24 infra.
13. 1 P. NicHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOmAIN § 1.11 (3d rev. ed. P. Rohan
1973).
14. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
15. E.g., James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937).
16. E.g., City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & N.R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912);
State v. Severson, 194 Minn. 644, 646, 261 N.W. 469, 470-71 (1935).
17. "No person shall . . . be deprived of . . .property, without due process of
law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"No State shall.. . deprive any person of ... property, without due process of
law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. County of Freeborn v. Bryson ............. Minn ............. , 210 N.W.2d
290, 296 (1973); accord, Southern Pac. Land Co. v. United States, 367 F.2d 161,
162 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1030 (1967); Housing & Redevelop-
ment Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 159 Minn. 1, 15, 104 N.W.2d
864, 874 (1960).
19. School Dist. No. 40 v. Bolstad, 121 Minn. 376, 380, 141 N.W. 801, 802-03
(1913).
20. See Northern States Power Co. v. Oslund, 236 Minn. 135, 137, 51 N.W.2d
808, 809 (1952): "Although lands may not be taken by eminent domain unless
such taking appears to be necessary, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that there
need be no showing of absolute or indispensable necessity, but only that the pro-
posed taking is reasonably necessary or convenient for the furtherance of the end
in view." Id. (emphasis in original).
Some states construe the narrow exceptions to the "no-review" rule more liber-
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ditionally, when a condemnation was challenged, the only permissible
inquiry was whether the governmental unit had exceeded its statu-
torily delegated power of eminent domain.21 Prior to Bryson the
environmental effects of proposed action had no bearing upon the
question of necessity in eminent domain proceedings, with limited4
exceptions provided by the public trust and prior public use doc-
trines.2 2 Bryson has changed this rule.
ally. See Mclntire, "Necessity" in Condemnation Cases-Who Speaks for the
People?, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 567-68 (1971). Montana permits full judicial
review of the necessity for public works projects in condemnation proceedings.
State Highway Comm'n v. Danielsen, 146 Mont. 539, 409 P.2d 443 (1965). Ver-
mont requires hearings by the State Highway Board on the necessity of a high-
way and its proposed location. The board must then seek an order of necessity
from the courts prior to condemnation. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 222-28 (1968),
as amended, §§ 226-28 (Supp. 1974).
21. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp. v. City of St. Louis Park, 265 Minn. 295,
300-01, 121 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (1963). In Bryson the statutory grant of author-
ity to the County is broadly worded:
(1) The several county boards shall have general supervision over county
highways, . ..and they may appropriate and expend sums . .. as they
deem necessary for the establishment ... of such highways.
(2) They may acquire by... eminent domain proceedings . .. all necessary
right of way for such highways ....
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.02(1), (2) (1960).
22. See, e.g., State v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 170 N.W.2d 95 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970); St. Paul Union Depot Co. v. City of St. Paul, 30
Minn. 359, 15 N.W. 684 (1883); Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Faribault, 23 Minn.
167 (1870).
A "public trust" is a property right held by one party for the benefit of the
public or a considerable portion thereof. The corpus of the public trust comprises
certain natural resources and the scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the en-
vironment entrusted to the sovereign for the benefit of the people. See Note, The
Public Trust in Public Waterways, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 219, 220 n.4 (1974). The
public trust doctrine prohibits impairment of the public trust or its appropriation
to private use. See id. at 243-45.
The "prior public use doctrine" forbids the condemnation for public use of
property already devoted to a public use. Such property may at the same time be
privately held. For property to be held for a public use, however, an enforceable
legal obligation (of the private owner) must exist to maintain it as a public use,
i.e. the obligation must form part of the public trust. This doctrine can prevent
the taking of environmentally significant land that is held as a public trust, but
most land is privately owned under circumstances that do not qualify as a prior
public use. These landowners must prove that the condemnation of their land is
arbitrary or capricious to prevent a taking. Note, Eminent Domain and the
Environment, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 655-56 (1971). The author discounts
legislative solutions to this problem, such as MERA, because "it is unrealistic to
expect the federal government and ... the fifty states to enact the necessary laws
in the near future." Id. at 658. He argues instead for judicial extension of the
prior public use doctrine. Id. at 658-64. See also Howard, State Constitutions
[Vol. 9:237
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The threshold question in Bryson was whether a landowner, pro-
ceeding under MERA, could oppose the County's exercise of its statu-
torily delegated eminent domain power. Although MERA is broadly
worded,23 the trial court believed that "the legislature did not intend
a limitation on a county's powers absent a specific reference to emi-
nent domain in the act."2 4 The supreme court, looking to the broad
language and express purpose of the legislation, 25 concluded that
"the legislature intended in appropriate cases that the power of emi-
nent domain possessed by governmental subdivisions-including the
power of a county to condemn land for a public highway-was to be
limited by the provisions of the act.
'
"
26
Since MERA limits the power of eminent domain, it follows that
the rule precluding inquiry into the necessity for a taking is also in-
operative whenever MERA is successfully invoked to oppose condem-
nation.27 The supreme court held that plaintiff need establish only
and the Environment, 58 VA. L. Rnv. 193 (1972); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv.
471 (1970).
23. See note 6 supra.
24 ............. Minn. at ....... , 210 N.W.2d at 296. The leading work on
MERA does not mention eminent domain in its account of the Act's legislative
history nor in any of the hypothetical case contexts in which the Act's operation
is outlined. See generally Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, supra
note 12.
MERA was patterned after a Model Act drafted by Professor J. L. Sax of the
University of Michigan and a similar act that had recently been enacted in
Michigan. Commenting on the Michigan Act, Professor Sax said: "It enlarges
the role of courts because it permits a plaintiff to assert that his right to environ-
mental quality has been violated in much the same way that one has always been
able to claim that a property or contract right has been violated." Sax & Conner,
supra note 4, at 1005. Thus, in limited measure, the same objective sought to be
achieved by the extension of the public trust doctrine advocated by Sax will be
advanced to the extent that the "uncharacteristically brief and plainspoken" acts
patterned after Sax's Model Act are given broad substantive content by the
judiciary. See generally Sax, supra note 22.
25. The statute states:
[E]ach person is entitled by right to the protection, preservation, and en-
hancement of . . . natural resources located within the state and . . . each
person has the responsibility to contribute to the protection, preservation,
and enhancement thereof. The legislature further declares its policy to
create and maintain within the state conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony.... Accordingly, it is in the public interest
to provide an adequate civil remedy to protect . . . natural resources located
within the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
MliN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 (Supp. 1974).
26 ................. Minn. at ................ , 210 N.W .2d at 296.
27. Id. at ................ 210 N.W.2d at 296-97.
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two elements to make out a prima fade case under MERA: the exis-
tence of a protectable natural resource, and the potential pollution,
impairment or destruction of that resource.28 Having made out a
prima fade case, plaintiff prevails if defendant-condemnor does not
successfully establish its defenses under MERA. 29
Once the burden of proof shifts to the condemnor, two affirmative
defenses are available. The condemnor "may rebut the prima facie
showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary,"' 0 or, as will
most often be the case, "[t]he defendant may also show... that there
is no feasible and prudent alternative and the conduct at issue is con-
sistent with and reasonably required for promotion of the public
health, safety, and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern
for the protection of its ... natural resources . . . ."' The supreme
court interpreted this to mean that "there should be a balancing of
ecological against technological considerations through the Environ-
28. Id. at ................ , 210 N.W.2d at 297. Natural resources are defined as
follows: "Natural resources shall include, but not be limited to, all mineral,
animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and his-
torical resources. Scenic and aesthetic resources shall also be considered natural
resources when owned by any governmental unit or agency." MINN. STAT. ANN.
J 116B.02(4) (Supp. 1974).
Plaintiff has the burden of showing that "the conduct of the defendant has, or
is likely to cause the pollution, impairment, or destruction of the . . . natural
resources located within the state ... " Id. § 116B.04. It is to be noted that
the burden of proof rests initially upon plaintiff. This is uniformly true of the
citizen-suit statutes so far enacted and constitutes one of the chief objections to
the legislative formulae for court enforced protection of the environment. See Note,
Eminent Domain and the Environment, supra note 22, at 657-58: "[lIt is pref-
erable to place the burden of proving the absence of environmental damage on
the condemnor. . . . The imposition of the burden of proof on the condemnor
would be dispositive if neither the condemnor nor condemnee were able to prove
the absence or probability of environmental damage."
29. See ................ Minn. at ................ , 210 N.W.2d at 297. Because plaintiff
under MERA has the initial burden of proof, the condemnor prevails if plaintiff
is unable to establish that the condemnor's conduct "is likely to materially ad-
versely affect the environment. . . ." Id. at ................ , 210 N.W.2d at 296 n.2;
see text at note 6 supra; note 28 and accompanying text supra. Thus, since the
Act can be a useful tool in the eminent domain context only if prospective relief
is available, MERA's effectiveness in opposing condemnation will depend upon
what degree of certainty of harm the Minnesota courts require plaintiff to show.
30. Miu'u¢. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04 (Supp. 1974).
31. Id. (emphasis added). The same phrase, "no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive," is employed in the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (f)
(1970). It was construed to require that "as a matter of sound engineering it
would not be feasible to build the highway along any other route." Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 9:237
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/10
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT
mental Rights Act." 3- The court's interpretation suggests that a show-
ing by plaintiff of feasible alternate routes less detrimental to the en-
vironment would strengthen his case, especially since under MERA
"[e]conomic considerations alone shall not constitute a defense .... -33
After holding that MERA imposes limits on eminent domain pro-
ceedings, the supreme court remanded for a determination whether
the rule applied to the particular facts in Bryson. The supreme court
feared that a "travesty of justice would occur if, after the county re-
routed the highway at a higher cost resulting in a less desirable
highway, the landowner... decided to divert the area to other uses." 3
Specific provision for equitable remedies in the Act35 suggests a solu-
tion that would prevent such an anomalous result-once the Act has
been successfully invoked to defeat condemnation, the court might
condition relief upon the imposition of an enforceable public trust or
a conservation easement on the environmentally significant land.36
32 .............. Minn  at ................, 210 N W 2d at 297. It should be noted that
the "balancing of ecological against technological considerations" called for in
Bryson sounds strikingly similar to the approach advanced by the Secretary of
Transportation in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13
(1971). Thus the Minnesota supreme court may have provided a standard dif-
ferent from that applied in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park. A balancing
approach is not necessarily inconsistent with the Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park approach, however, if the scale is so weighted as to tip only when there is
no alternative "as a matter of sound engineering." See note 31 supra.
33. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04 (Supp. 1974).
3+ ............... Minn  at .............. 210 N W.2d at 297 A family farm is exempt
from suit under MERA. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02(2) (Supp. 1974). "When
the natural resource is located on land which would be exempt from suit against
the landowner . . . the fact that there is no guarantee that it will be preserved
by the landowner's future conduct may be balanced against a prima facie showing
that a protectable natural resource presently exists." ................ Minn. at ...............
210 N.W.2d at 298. Consequently, using the balancing test discussed in note 32
supra, the supreme court termed Bryson's "the barest of prima facie showings...
............... Minn. at ..............., 210 N W .2d at 297.
35. "The court may grant declaratory relief, temporary and permanent equitable
relief, or may impose such conditions upon a party as are necessary or appropriate
to protect the air, water, land or other natural resources located within the state
from pollution, impairment, or destruction." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.07 (Supp.
1974).
36, This solution is suggested as a quid pro quo for the extension of the prior
public use doctrine to environmentally significant lands. Note, Eminent Domain
and the Environment, supra note 22, at 660-61. Plaintiffs in Bryson anticipated
and encouraged the adoption of such a solution by "signing an easement by which
they will give to the State of Minnesota through its Department of Natural Re-
sources a permanent easement for wild life purposes over the entire marsh located
19751
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Whether in such a case the courts will deny the remedy that Bryson
held to be available under MERA remains to be seen. To do so,
however, would appear out of keeping with the supreme court's con-
ception of the legislative intent.3 7
By granting citizens the right to challenge the taking of environ-
mentally significant lands, Bryson establishes a new limit upon the
power of eminent domain. Equally important is the introduction of
another variable, environmental considerations, into the formulation
of decisions to exercise the power of eminent domain. Planners, long
insulated from judicial review by the "necessity rule," will now en-
counter more effective opposition. 31 Although Bryson is not a total
victory for environmentalists, 39 few who have witnessed the devasta-
tion caused by ill-considered highway route selection will regret the
principle established by the decision.40 Bryson forces those who exer-
cise the power of eminent domain to consider the environmental ef-
fects of their conduct. Hopefully, the right granted the people to
protect their environment will cause planners to "look at the totality
of what they are doing."".
Frederick M. Baker
on their farm." Letter from R.O. Slen, Attorney for Plaintiff, to Frederick M.
Baker, Feb. 7, 1974, on file with the Urban Law Annual.
Should the Minnesota courts accept this solution, interests so conveyed will be-
come part of what Sax broadly terms the public trust, further extending the
application of that doctrine to privately owned lands. See note 22 supra. See
generally Sax, supra note 22. Since such trusts or easements would presumably
run with the land, the owner could never alienate the public trust therein, which
would conform to the traditional theoretical public trust model. See id at 475-77;
cf. Howard, supra note 22.
37. "Where a statute such as this is drafted in broad and comprehensive lan-
guage, we are not justified in engrafting exceptions upon it."........... Minn. at
-................ 210 N.W.2d at 296.
38. In Michigan, the first state to enact such legislation, "some suggestive,
anecdotal evidence [exists] that the statute has caused [governmental] agency
behavior to change" and it is "apparently having an impact in the private sector,
too." Sax & Conner, supra note 4, at 1050, 1053.
39. The eminent domain power of the state itself, as distinguished from the
powers delegated by it to state agencies and governmental subdivisions, is pre-
eminent and remains unaffected by the decision. See State v. Christopher, 284
Minn. 233, 170 N.W.2d 95 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970).
40. "If one seeks a single example of an assertion of simple-minded purpose,
the analytical rather than the synthetic view and indifference to natural process-
indeed an anti-ecological view-then the highway and its creators leap to mind."
I. McHARG, DESIGN wITH NATURE 31 (1969).
41. See text at note 1 supra. In discussing whether a project should be pursued
presently or in the future the Court in Udall v. FP, 387 U.S. 428, 436 (1967),
stated: "Beyond that is the question whether any dam should be constructed."
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